Verbal Ability Test - 5

Monopolies are bad in national politics and worse in international politics. The unipolar world led by the US is an example of political monopoly. In the language of history and politics, monopolies are discussed in terms of balance of power. What we have today is an imbalance of power. The US-led war against Iraq needs to be seen in the context of this imbalance. There has been much talk about the need for a multipolar world as an ideal solution to the existing anarchy in the international arena. The US – UK combine have been considered to be the perpetrators of the war. They disregarded global public opinion and have gone outside the mandate of the United Nations. This is an indication of US considering itself the only superpower. Its consideration may be justified because it has all the pervading might and also the necessary will. Its might is in two domains: one, military, and the other, economic. On every issue of any importance that confronts foreign policy-making of any country, US interests become vital. This omnipresence of the US makes it different from any other country. Some political observers argue that this is temporary; that the Russians will be back; that the Germans, Japanese, Europeans are coming; that China is not far away. In short, we occupy a period of metamorphosis from a bipolar to a multipolar world, a period that may constitute a unipolar moment but that phase may be over shortly. When will this unipolar moment be over? None has the answer to this question. Most observers view US as somewhere between primacy and dominance, depending on the issue. The main question is how to deal with hegemony, primacy or dominance. In dealing with a big power, a smaller power must choose either balancing or bandwagoning or hiding. In a unipolar world, the general trend of foreign policy will be to bandwagon. Middle powers will need to bandwagon less than small powers and on particular issues may be able to balance or hide.

Monopolies are bad in national politics and worse in international politics. The unipolar world led by the US is an example of political monopoly. In the language of history and politics, monopolies are discussed in terms of balance of power. What we have today is an imbalance of power. The US-led war against Iraq needs to be seen in the context of this imbalance. There has been much talk about the need for a multipolar world as an ideal solution to the existing anarchy in the international arena. The US – UK combine have been considered to be the perpetrators of the war. They disregarded global public opinion and have gone outside the mandate of the United Nations. This is an indication of US considering itself the only superpower. Its consideration may be justified because it has all the pervading might and also the necessary will. Its might is in two domains: one, military, and the other, economic. On every issue of any importance that confronts foreign policy-making of any country, US interests become vital. This omnipresence of the US makes it different from any other country. Some political observers argue that this is temporary; that the Russians will be back; that the Germans, Japanese, Europeans are coming; that China is not far away. In short, we occupy a period of metamorphosis from a bipolar to a multipolar world, a period that may constitute a unipolar moment but that phase may be over shortly. When will this unipolar moment be over? None has the answer to this question. Most observers view US as somewhere between primacy and dominance, depending on the issue. The main question is how to deal with hegemony, primacy or dominance. In dealing with a big power, a smaller power must choose either balancing or bandwagoning or hiding. In a unipolar world, the general trend of foreign policy will be to bandwagon. Middle powers will need to bandwagon less than small powers and on particular issues may be able to balance or hide.

Monopolies are bad in national politics and worse in international politics. The unipolar world led by the US is an example of political monopoly. In the language of history and politics, monopolies are discussed in terms of balance of power. What we have today is an imbalance of power. The US-led war against Iraq needs to be seen in the context of this imbalance. There has been much talk about the need for a multipolar world as an ideal solution to the existing anarchy in the international arena. The US – UK combine have been considered to be the perpetrators of the war. They disregarded global public opinion and have gone outside the mandate of the United Nations. This is an indication of US considering itself the only superpower. Its consideration may be justified because it has all the pervading might and also the necessary will. Its might is in two domains: one, military, and the other, economic. On every issue of any importance that confronts foreign policy-making of any country, US interests become vital. This omnipresence of the US makes it different from any other country. Some political observers argue that this is temporary; that the Russians will be back; that the Germans, Japanese, Europeans are coming; that China is not far away. In short, we occupy a period of metamorphosis from a bipolar to a multipolar world, a period that may constitute a unipolar moment but that phase may be over shortly. When will this unipolar moment be over? None has the answer to this question. Most observers view US as somewhere between primacy and dominance, depending on the issue. The main question is how to deal with hegemony, primacy or dominance. In dealing with a big power, a smaller power must choose either balancing or bandwagoning or hiding. In a unipolar world, the general trend of foreign policy will be to bandwagon. Middle powers will need to bandwagon less than small powers and on particular issues may be able to balance or hide

When times are hard, doomsayers are aplenty. The problem is that if you listen to them too carefully, you tend to overlook the most obvious signs of change. 2011 was a bad year. Can 2012 be any worse? Doomsday forecasts are the easiest to make these days. So let's try a contrarian's forecast instead. Let's start with the global economy. We have seen a steady flow of good news from the US. The employment situation seems to be improving rapidly and consumer sentiment, reflected in retail expenditures on discretionary items like electronics and clothes, has picked up. If these trends sustain, the US might post better growth numbers for 2012 than the 1.5-1.8 percent being forecast currently. Japan is likely to pull out of a recession in 2012 as postearthquake reconstruction efforts gather momentum and the fiscal stimulus announced in 2011 begins to pay off. The consensus estimate for growth in Japan is a respectable 2 per cent for 2012.

The "hard-landing" scenario for China remains and will remain a myth. Growth might decelerate further from the 9 per cent that it expected to clock in 2011 but is unlikely to drop below 8-8.5 percent in 2012. Europe is certainly in a spot of trouble. It is perhaps already in recession and for 2012 it is likely to post mildly negative growth. The risk of implosion has dwindled over the last few months - peripheral economies like Greece, Italy and Spain have new governments in place and have made progress towards genuine economic reform. Even with some of these positive factors in place, we have to accept the fact that global growth in 2012 will be tepid. But there is a flipside to this. Softer growth means lower demand for commodities and this is likely to drive a correction in commodity prices. Lower commodity inflation will enable emerging market central banks to reverse their monetary stance. China, for instance, has already reversed its stance and has pared its reserve ratio twice. The RBI also seems poised for a reversal in its rate cycle as headline inflation seems well on its way to its target of 7 per cent for March 2012. That said, oil might be an exception to the general trend in commodities. Rising geopolitical tensions, particularly the continuing face-off between Iran and the US, might lead to a spurt in prices.

It might make sense for our oil companies to hedge this risk instead of buying oil in the spot market. As inflation fears abate and emerging market central banks begin to cut rates, two things could happen Lower commodity inflation would mean lower interest rates and better credit availability. This could set a floor to growth and slowly reverse the business cycle within these economies. Second, as the fear of untamed, runaway inflation in these economies abates, the global investor's comfort levels with their markets will increase. Which of the emerging markets will outperform and who will get left behind? In an environment in which global growth is likely to be weak, economies like India that have a powerful domestic consumption dynamic should lead; those dependent on exports should, prima facie, fall behind. Specifically for India, a fall in the exchange rate could not have come at a better time. It will help Indian exporters gain market share even it global trade remains depressed. More importantly, it could lead to massive import substitution that favours domestic producers. Let's now focus on India and start with a caveat. It is important not to confuse a short-run cyclical dip with a permanent de-rating of its long-term structural potential. The arithmetic is simple. Our growth rate can be in the range of 7-10 per cent depending on policy action. Ten per cent if we get everything right, 7 per cent if we get it all wrong. Which policies and reforms are critical to taking us to our 10 per cent potential ?

In judging this, let's again be careful. Let us not go by the laundry list of reforms that FIIs like to wave: increase in foreign equity limits in foreign shareholding, greater voting rights for institutional shareholders in banks, FDI in retail, etc. These can have an impact only at the margin. We need not bend over backwards to appease the FIIs through these reforms - they will invest in our markets when momentum picks up and will be the first to exit when the momentum flags, reforms or not. The reforms that we need are the ones that can actually raise out. Sustainable long-term growth rate. These have to come in areas like better targeting of subsidies, making projects in infrastructure viable so that they draw capital, raising the productivity of agriculture, improving healthcare and education, bringing the parallel economy under the tax net, implementing fundamental reforms in taxation like GST and the direct tax code and finally easing the myriad rules and regulations that make doing business in India such a nightmare. A number of these things do not require new legislation and can be done through executive order.

When times are hard, doomsayers are aplenty. The problem is that if you listen to them too carefully, you tend to overlook the most obvious signs of change. 2011 was a bad year. Can 2012 be any worse? Doomsday forecasts are the easiest to make these days. So let's try a contrarian's forecast instead. Let's start with the global economy. We have seen a steady flow of good news from the US. The employment situation seems to be improving rapidly and consumer sentiment, reflected in retail expenditures on discretionary items like electronics and clothes, has picked up. If these trends sustain, the US might post better growth numbers for 2012 than the 1.5-1.8 percent being forecast currently. Japan is likely to pull out of a recession in 2012 as postearthquake reconstruction efforts gather momentum and the fiscal stimulus announced in 2011 begins to pay off. The consensus estimate for growth in Japan is a respectable 2 per cent for 2012.

The "hard-landing" scenario for China remains and will remain a myth. Growth might decelerate further from the 9 per cent that it expected to clock in 2011 but is unlikely to drop below 8-8.5 percent in 2012. Europe is certainly in a spot of trouble. It is perhaps already in recession and for 2012 it is likely to post mildly negative growth. The risk of implosion has dwindled over the last few months - peripheral economies like Greece, Italy and Spain have new governments in place and have made progress towards genuine economic reform. Even with some of these positive factors in place, we have to accept the fact that global growth in 2012 will be tepid. But there is a flipside to this. Softer growth means lower demand for commodities and this is likely to drive a correction in commodity prices. Lower commodity inflation will enable emerging market central banks to reverse their monetary stance. China, for instance, has already reversed its stance and has pared its reserve ratio twice. The RBI also seems poised for a reversal in its rate cycle as headline inflation seems well on its way to its target of 7 per cent for March 2012. That said, oil might be an exception to the general trend in commodities. Rising geopolitical tensions, particularly the continuing face-off between Iran and the US, might lead to a spurt in prices.

It might make sense for our oil companies to hedge this risk instead of buying oil in the spot market. As inflation fears abate and emerging market central banks begin to cut rates, two things could happen Lower commodity inflation would mean lower interest rates and better credit availability. This could set a floor to growth and slowly reverse the business cycle within these economies. Second, as the fear of untamed, runaway inflation in these economies abates, the global investor's comfort levels with their markets will increase. Which of the emerging markets will outperform and who will get left behind? In an environment in which global growth is likely to be weak, economies like India that have a powerful domestic consumption dynamic should lead; those dependent on exports should, prima facie, fall behind. Specifically for India, a fall in the exchange rate could not have come at a better time. It will help Indian exporters gain market share even it global trade remains depressed. More importantly, it could lead to massive import substitution that favours domestic producers. Let's now focus on India and start with a caveat. It is important not to confuse a short-run cyclical dip with a permanent de-rating of its long-term structural potential. The arithmetic is simple. Our growth rate can be in the range of 7-10 per cent depending on policy action. Ten per cent if we get everything right, 7 per cent if we get it all wrong. Which policies and reforms are critical to taking us to our 10 per cent potential ?

In judging this, let's again be careful. Let us not go by the laundry list of reforms that FIIs like to wave: increase in foreign equity limits in foreign shareholding, greater voting rights for institutional shareholders in banks, FDI in retail, etc. These can have an impact only at the margin. We need not bend over backwards to appease the FIIs through these reforms - they will invest in our markets when momentum picks up and will be the first to exit when the momentum flags, reforms or not. The reforms that we need are the ones that can actually raise out. Sustainable long-term growth rate. These have to come in areas like better targeting of subsidies, making projects in infrastructure viable so that they draw capital, raising the productivity of agriculture, improving healthcare and education, bringing the parallel economy under the tax net, implementing fundamental reforms in taxation like GST and the direct tax code and finally easing the myriad rules and regulations that make doing business in India such a nightmare. A number of these things do not require new legislation and can be done through executive order.

When times are hard, doomsayers are aplenty. The problem is that if you listen to them too carefully, you tend to overlook the most obvious signs of change. 2011 was a bad year. Can 2012 be any worse? Doomsday forecasts are the easiest to make these days. So let's try a contrarian's forecast instead. Let's start with the global economy. We have seen a steady flow of good news from the US. The employment situation seems to be improving rapidly and consumer sentiment, reflected in retail expenditures on discretionary items like electronics and clothes, has picked up. If these trends sustain, the US might post better growth numbers for 2012 than the 1.5-1.8 percent being forecast currently. Japan is likely to pull out of a recession in 2012 as postearthquake reconstruction efforts gather momentum and the fiscal stimulus announced in 2011 begins to pay off. The consensus estimate for growth in Japan is a respectable 2 per cent for 2012.

The "hard-landing" scenario for China remains and will remain a myth. Growth might decelerate further from the 9 per cent that it expected to clock in 2011 but is unlikely to drop below 8-8.5 percent in 2012. Europe is certainly in a spot of trouble. It is perhaps already in recession and for 2012 it is likely to post mildly negative growth. The risk of implosion has dwindled over the last few months - peripheral economies like Greece, Italy and Spain have new governments in place and have made progress towards genuine economic reform. Even with some of these positive factors in place, we have to accept the fact that global growth in 2012 will be tepid. But there is a flipside to this. Softer growth means lower demand for commodities and this is likely to drive a correction in commodity prices. Lower commodity inflation will enable emerging market central banks to reverse their monetary stance. China, for instance, has already reversed its stance and has pared its reserve ratio twice. The RBI also seems poised for a reversal in its rate cycle as headline inflation seems well on its way to its target of 7 per cent for March 2012. That said, oil might be an exception to the general trend in commodities. Rising geopolitical tensions, particularly the continuing face-off between Iran and the US, might lead to a spurt in prices.

It might make sense for our oil companies to hedge this risk instead of buying oil in the spot market. As inflation fears abate and emerging market central banks begin to cut rates, two things could happen Lower commodity inflation would mean lower interest rates and better credit availability. This could set a floor to growth and slowly reverse the business cycle within these economies. Second, as the fear of untamed, runaway inflation in these economies abates, the global investor's comfort levels with their markets will increase. Which of the emerging markets will outperform and who will get left behind? In an environment in which global growth is likely to be weak, economies like India that have a powerful domestic consumption dynamic should lead; those dependent on exports should, prima facie, fall behind. Specifically for India, a fall in the exchange rate could not have come at a better time. It will help Indian exporters gain market share even it global trade remains depressed. More importantly, it could lead to massive import substitution that favours domestic producers. Let's now focus on India and start with a caveat. It is important not to confuse a short-run cyclical dip with a permanent de-rating of its long-term structural potential. The arithmetic is simple. Our growth rate can be in the range of 7-10 per cent depending on policy action. Ten per cent if we get everything right, 7 per cent if we get it all wrong. Which policies and reforms are critical to taking us to our 10 per cent potential ?

In judging this, let's again be careful. Let us not go by the laundry list of reforms that FIIs like to wave: increase in foreign equity limits in foreign shareholding, greater voting rights for institutional shareholders in banks, FDI in retail, etc. These can have an impact only at the margin. We need not bend over backwards to appease the FIIs through these reforms - they will invest in our markets when momentum picks up and will be the first to exit when the momentum flags, reforms or not. The reforms that we need are the ones that can actually raise out. Sustainable long-term growth rate. These have to come in areas like better targeting of subsidies, making projects in infrastructure viable so that they draw capital, raising the productivity of agriculture, improving healthcare and education, bringing the parallel economy under the tax net, implementing fundamental reforms in taxation like GST and the direct tax code and finally easing the myriad rules and regulations that make doing business in India such a nightmare. A number of these things do not require new legislation and can be done through executive order.

When times are hard, doomsayers are aplenty. The problem is that if you listen to them too carefully, you tend to overlook the most obvious signs of change. 2011 was a bad year. Can 2012 be any worse? Doomsday forecasts are the easiest to make these days. So let's try a contrarian's forecast instead. Let's start with the global economy. We have seen a steady flow of good news from the US. The employment situation seems to be improving rapidly and consumer sentiment, reflected in retail expenditures on discretionary items like electronics and clothes, has picked up. If these trends sustain, the US might post better growth numbers for 2012 than the 1.5-1.8 percent being forecast currently. Japan is likely to pull out of a recession in 2012 as postearthquake reconstruction efforts gather momentum and the fiscal stimulus announced in 2011 begins to pay off. The consensus estimate for growth in Japan is a respectable 2 per cent for 2012.

The "hard-landing" scenario for China remains and will remain a myth. Growth might decelerate further from the 9 per cent that it expected to clock in 2011 but is unlikely to drop below 8-8.5 percent in 2012. Europe is certainly in a spot of trouble. It is perhaps already in recession and for 2012 it is likely to post mildly negative growth. The risk of implosion has dwindled over the last few months - peripheral economies like Greece, Italy and Spain have new governments in place and have made progress towards genuine economic reform. Even with some of these positive factors in place, we have to accept the fact that global growth in 2012 will be tepid. But there is a flipside to this. Softer growth means lower demand for commodities and this is likely to drive a correction in commodity prices. Lower commodity inflation will enable emerging market central banks to reverse their monetary stance. China, for instance, has already reversed its stance and has pared its reserve ratio twice. The RBI also seems poised for a reversal in its rate cycle as headline inflation seems well on its way to its target of 7 per cent for March 2012. That said, oil might be an exception to the general trend in commodities. Rising geopolitical tensions, particularly the continuing face-off between Iran and the US, might lead to a spurt in prices.

It might make sense for our oil companies to hedge this risk instead of buying oil in the spot market. As inflation fears abate and emerging market central banks begin to cut rates, two things could happen Lower commodity inflation would mean lower interest rates and better credit availability. This could set a floor to growth and slowly reverse the business cycle within these economies. Second, as the fear of untamed, runaway inflation in these economies abates, the global investor's comfort levels with their markets will increase. Which of the emerging markets will outperform and who will get left behind? In an environment in which global growth is likely to be weak, economies like India that have a powerful domestic consumption dynamic should lead; those dependent on exports should, prima facie, fall behind. Specifically for India, a fall in the exchange rate could not have come at a better time. It will help Indian exporters gain market share even it global trade remains depressed. More importantly, it could lead to massive import substitution that favours domestic producers. Let's now focus on India and start with a caveat. It is important not to confuse a short-run cyclical dip with a permanent de-rating of its long-term structural potential. The arithmetic is simple. Our growth rate can be in the range of 7-10 per cent depending on policy action. Ten per cent if we get everything right, 7 per cent if we get it all wrong. Which policies and reforms are critical to taking us to our 10 per cent potential ?

In judging this, let's again be careful. Let us not go by the laundry list of reforms that FIIs like to wave: increase in foreign equity limits in foreign shareholding, greater voting rights for institutional shareholders in banks, FDI in retail, etc. These can have an impact only at the margin. We need not bend over backwards to appease the FIIs through these reforms - they will invest in our markets when momentum picks up and will be the first to exit when the momentum flags, reforms or not. The reforms that we need are the ones that can actually raise out. Sustainable long-term growth rate. These have to come in areas like better targeting of subsidies, making projects in infrastructure viable so that they draw capital, raising the productivity of agriculture, improving healthcare and education, bringing the parallel economy under the tax net, implementing fundamental reforms in taxation like GST and the direct tax code and finally easing the myriad rules and regulations that make doing business in India such a nightmare. A number of these things do not require new legislation and can be done through executive order.

When times are hard, doomsayers are aplenty. The problem is that if you listen to them too carefully, you tend to overlook the most obvious signs of change. 2011 was a bad year. Can 2012 be any worse? Doomsday forecasts are the easiest to make these days. So let's try a contrarian's forecast instead. Let's start with the global economy. We have seen a steady flow of good news from the US. The employment situation seems to be improving rapidly and consumer sentiment, reflected in retail expenditures on discretionary items like electronics and clothes, has picked up. If these trends sustain, the US might post better growth numbers for 2012 than the 1.5-1.8 percent being forecast currently. Japan is likely to pull out of a recession in 2012 as postearthquake reconstruction efforts gather momentum and the fiscal stimulus announced in 2011 begins to pay off. The consensus estimate for growth in Japan is a respectable 2 per cent for 2012.

The "hard-landing" scenario for China remains and will remain a myth. Growth might decelerate further from the 9 per cent that it expected to clock in 2011 but is unlikely to drop below 8-8.5 percent in 2012. Europe is certainly in a spot of trouble. It is perhaps already in recession and for 2012 it is likely to post mildly negative growth. The risk of implosion has dwindled over the last few months - peripheral economies like Greece, Italy and Spain have new governments in place and have made progress towards genuine economic reform. Even with some of these positive factors in place, we have to accept the fact that global growth in 2012 will be tepid. But there is a flipside to this. Softer growth means lower demand for commodities and this is likely to drive a correction in commodity prices. Lower commodity inflation will enable emerging market central banks to reverse their monetary stance. China, for instance, has already reversed its stance and has pared its reserve ratio twice. The RBI also seems poised for a reversal in its rate cycle as headline inflation seems well on its way to its target of 7 per cent for March 2012. That said, oil might be an exception to the general trend in commodities. Rising geopolitical tensions, particularly the continuing face-off between Iran and the US, might lead to a spurt in prices.

It might make sense for our oil companies to hedge this risk instead of buying oil in the spot market. As inflation fears abate and emerging market central banks begin to cut rates, two things could happen Lower commodity inflation would mean lower interest rates and better credit availability. This could set a floor to growth and slowly reverse the business cycle within these economies. Second, as the fear of untamed, runaway inflation in these economies abates, the global investor's comfort levels with their markets will increase. Which of the emerging markets will outperform and who will get left behind? In an environment in which global growth is likely to be weak, economies like India that have a powerful domestic consumption dynamic should lead; those dependent on exports should, prima facie, fall behind. Specifically for India, a fall in the exchange rate could not have come at a better time. It will help Indian exporters gain market share even it global trade remains depressed. More importantly, it could lead to massive import substitution that favours domestic producers. Let's now focus on India and start with a caveat. It is important not to confuse a short-run cyclical dip with a permanent de-rating of its long-term structural potential. The arithmetic is simple. Our growth rate can be in the range of 7-10 per cent depending on policy action. Ten per cent if we get everything right, 7 per cent if we get it all wrong. Which policies and reforms are critical to taking us to our 10 per cent potential ?

In judging this, let's again be careful. Let us not go by the laundry list of reforms that FIIs like to wave: increase in foreign equity limits in foreign shareholding, greater voting rights for institutional shareholders in banks, FDI in retail, etc. These can have an impact only at the margin. We need not bend over backwards to appease the FIIs through these reforms - they will invest in our markets when momentum picks up and will be the first to exit when the momentum flags, reforms or not. The reforms that we need are the ones that can actually raise out. Sustainable long-term growth rate. These have to come in areas like better targeting of subsidies, making projects in infrastructure viable so that they draw capital, raising the productivity of agriculture, improving healthcare and education, bringing the parallel economy under the tax net, implementing fundamental reforms in taxation like GST and the direct tax code and finally easing the myriad rules and regulations that make doing business in India such a nightmare. A number of these things do not require new legislation and can be done through executive order.

“Rivers should link, not divide us,” said the Indian Prime Minister expressing concern over interstate disputes and urged state governments to show “understanding and consideration, statesmanship and an appreciation of the other point of view.”

Water conflicts in India now reach every level; divide every segment of our society, political parties, states, regions and subregions within states, districts, castes and groups and individual farmers. Water conflicts within and between many developing countries are also taking a serious turn. Fortunately, the “water wars”, forecast by so many, have not yet materialized. War has taken place, but over oil, not water. Water is radically altering and affecting political boundaries all over the world, between as well as within countries. In India, water conflicts are likely to worsen before they begin to be resolved. Till then they pose a significant threat to economic growth, security and health of the ecosystem and the victims are likely to be the poorest of the poor as well as the very sources of water - rivers, wetlands and aquifers. Conflicts might sound bad or negative, but they are logical developments in the absence of proper democratic, legal and administrative mechanisms to handle issues at the root of water conflicts.

Part of the problem stems from the specific nature of water, namely that water is divisible and amenable to sharing; one unit of water used by one is a unit denied to others; it has multiple uses and users and involves resultant trade-offs. Excludability is an inherent problem and very often exclusion costs involved are very high: it involves the issue of graded scales and boundaries and need for evolving a corresponding understanding around them. Finally, the way water is planned, used and managed causes externalities, both positive and negative, and many of them are unidirectional and asymmetric. There is a relatively greater visibility as well as a greater body of experience in evolving policies, frameworks, legal setups and administrative mechanisms dealing with immobile natural resources, however contested the space may be.

Reformists as well as revolutionary movements are rooted in issues related to land. Several political and legal interventions addressing the issue of equity and societal justice have been attempted. Most countries have gone through land reforms of one type or another. Issues related to forests have also generated a body of comprehensive literature on forest resources and rights. Though conflicts over them have not necessarily been effectively or adequately resolved, they have received much more serious attention, have been studied in their own right and practical as well as theoretical means of dealing with them have been sought. In contrast, water conflicts have not received the same kind of attention.

“Rivers should link, not divide us,” said the Indian Prime Minister expressing concern over interstate disputes and urged state governments to show “understanding and consideration, statesmanship and an appreciation of the other point of view.”

Water conflicts in India now reach every level; divide every segment of our society, political parties, states, regions and subregions within states, districts, castes and groups and individual farmers. Water conflicts within and between many developing countries are also taking a serious turn. Fortunately, the “water wars”, forecast by so many, have not yet materialized. War has taken place, but over oil, not water. Water is radically altering and affecting political boundaries all over the world, between as well as within countries. In India, water conflicts are likely to worsen before they begin to be resolved. Till then they pose a significant threat to economic growth, security and health of the ecosystem and the victims are likely to be the poorest of the poor as well as the very sources of water - rivers, wetlands and aquifers. Conflicts might sound bad or negative, but they are logical developments in the absence of proper democratic, legal and administrative mechanisms to handle issues at the root of water conflicts.

Part of the problem stems from the specific nature of water, namely that water is divisible and amenable to sharing; one unit of water used by one is a unit denied to others; it has multiple uses and users and involves resultant trade-offs. Excludability is an inherent problem and very often exclusion costs involved are very high: it involves the issue of graded scales and boundaries and need for evolving a corresponding understanding around them. Finally, the way water is planned, used and managed causes externalities, both positive and negative, and many of them are unidirectional and asymmetric. There is a relatively greater visibility as well as a greater body of experience in evolving policies, frameworks, legal setups and administrative mechanisms dealing with immobile natural resources, however contested the space may be.

Reformists as well as revolutionary movements are rooted in issues related to land. Several political and legal interventions addressing the issue of equity and societal justice have been attempted. Most countries have gone through land reforms of one type or another. Issues related to forests have also generated a body of comprehensive literature on forest resources and rights. Though conflicts over them have not necessarily been effectively or adequately resolved, they have received much more serious attention, have been studied in their own right and practical as well as theoretical means of dealing with them have been sought. In contrast, water conflicts have not received the same kind of attention.

“Rivers should link, not divide us,” said the Indian Prime Minister expressing concern over interstate disputes and urged state governments to show “understanding and consideration, statesmanship and an appreciation of the other point of view.”

Water conflicts in India now reach every level; divide every segment of our society, political parties, states, regions and subregions within states, districts, castes and groups and individual farmers. Water conflicts within and between many developing countries are also taking a serious turn. Fortunately, the “water wars”, forecast by so many, have not yet materialized. War has taken place, but over oil, not water. Water is radically altering and affecting political boundaries all over the world, between as well as within countries. In India, water conflicts are likely to worsen before they begin to be resolved. Till then they pose a significant threat to economic growth, security and health of the ecosystem and the victims are likely to be the poorest of the poor as well as the very sources of water - rivers, wetlands and aquifers. Conflicts might sound bad or negative, but they are logical developments in the absence of proper democratic, legal and administrative mechanisms to handle issues at the root of water conflicts.

Part of the problem stems from the specific nature of water, namely that water is divisible and amenable to sharing; one unit of water used by one is a unit denied to others; it has multiple uses and users and involves resultant trade-offs. Excludability is an inherent problem and very often exclusion costs involved are very high: it involves the issue of graded scales and boundaries and need for evolving a corresponding understanding around them. Finally, the way water is planned, used and managed causes externalities, both positive and negative, and many of them are unidirectional and asymmetric. There is a relatively greater visibility as well as a greater body of experience in evolving policies, frameworks, legal setups and administrative mechanisms dealing with immobile natural resources, however contested the space may be.

Reformists as well as revolutionary movements are rooted in issues related to land. Several political and legal interventions addressing the issue of equity and societal justice have been attempted. Most countries have gone through land reforms of one type or another. Issues related to forests have also generated a body of comprehensive literature on forest resources and rights. Though conflicts over them have not necessarily been effectively or adequately resolved, they have received much more serious attention, have been studied in their own right and practical as well as theoretical means of dealing with them have been sought. In contrast, water conflicts have not received the same kind of attention.

We have witnessed several disasters in recent times—some natural, others man-made. The frequency of such calamities has inured us and deadened our collective sensitivity, but that does not reduce the enormity of the personal tragedy of each victim's family and community. The economic loss is only secondary to the human suffering, but is also substantial. The Government, whether State or Central, has standardised its response. This consists of reacting late, blaming others, visits by VIPs announcing a relief package including compensation for those affected, and then forgetting all about it.

There seems to be little attempt at drawing lessons from each disaster, storing the knowledge for future use, and long-term planning for possible pre-emptive action. Preparedness for disasters thus falls short of what is possible using today's technologies. Floods in many parts of India like the states of Bihar and Assam are a yearly phenomenon. Yet the government seems to be caught by surprise year after year. It is obvious that tarpaulins, vaccines and other medicines, clothes, satellite phones, large numbers of doctors and paramedical staff, etc will be needed as will boats and buses for evacuation. This is known to all those who have combated emergencies, yet the non-availability of these essential services and commodities occurs. Worse, the organisational structure and mechanisms for dealing with disasters are lethargic and ill-defined.

The National Disaster Management Agency set up a short time ago, being a Central Government agency, has its limitations relating to infringing the jurisdiction of states. It could have aggregated and disseminated experiences and knowledge, stocked many of the essential items required in an emergency or worked with agencies to ensure sufficient stocks, but hasn't. While the reaction to major disasters is dismal, the response to emergencies like accident is equally sad. Victims lie unattended since passers-by are wary of getting caught in a labyrinthine of police and legal systems. The resulting delay in treatment converts injuries into deaths. Of late, unique and free service to provide assistance in emergency cases is operational.

Emergency Management and Research institute (EMRI) is a professionally managed operation—initiated by the vision and grant from Ramalinga Raju. The service, which is a successful example of public-private partnership, is likely to become operational in a few states in the near future. Given the sad failure of conventional government organisations in handling disasters, it is time we looked at the PPP model as an alternative without the government seeking in any way to abdicate its responsibility. While the state provides the funding, private organisations will provide the drive, professionalism, competent management and output-linked efficiency of a good corporate organisation. Combining the sensitivity and purpose of an NGO with private entrepreneurial drive to handle disasters together is thus a worthwhile challenge for both corporates and the government?

We have witnessed several disasters in recent times—some natural, others man-made. The frequency of such calamities has inured us and deadened our collective sensitivity, but that does not reduce the enormity of the personal tragedy of each victim's family and community. The economic loss is only secondary to the human suffering, but is also substantial. The Government, whether State or Central, has standardised its response. This consists of reacting late, blaming others, visits by VIPs announcing a relief package including compensation for those affected, and then forgetting all about it.

There seems to be little attempt at drawing lessons from each disaster, storing the knowledge for future use, and long-term planning for possible pre-emptive action. Preparedness for disasters thus falls short of what is possible using today's technologies. Floods in many parts of India like the states of Bihar and Assam are a yearly phenomenon. Yet the government seems to be caught by surprise year after year. It is obvious that tarpaulins, vaccines and other medicines, clothes, satellite phones, large numbers of doctors and paramedical staff, etc will be needed as will boats and buses for evacuation. This is known to all those who have combated emergencies, yet the non-availability of these essential services and commodities occurs. Worse, the organisational structure and mechanisms for dealing with disasters are lethargic and ill-defined.

The National Disaster Management Agency set up a short time ago, being a Central Government agency, has its limitations relating to infringing the jurisdiction of states. It could have aggregated and disseminated experiences and knowledge, stocked many of the essential items required in an emergency or worked with agencies to ensure sufficient stocks, but hasn't. While the reaction to major disasters is dismal, the response to emergencies like accident is equally sad. Victims lie unattended since passers-by are wary of getting caught in a labyrinthine of police and legal systems. The resulting delay in treatment converts injuries into deaths. Of late, unique and free service to provide assistance in emergency cases is operational.

Emergency Management and Research institute (EMRI) is a professionally managed operation—initiated by the vision and grant from Ramalinga Raju. The service, which is a successful example of public-private partnership, is likely to become operational in a few states in the near future. Given the sad failure of conventional government organisations in handling disasters, it is time we looked at the PPP model as an alternative without the government seeking in any way to abdicate its responsibility. While the state provides the funding, private organisations will provide the drive, professionalism, competent management and output-linked efficiency of a good corporate organisation. Combining the sensitivity and purpose of an NGO with private entrepreneurial drive to handle disasters together is thus a worthwhile challenge for both corporates and the government?

We have witnessed several disasters in recent times—some natural, others man-made. The frequency of such calamities has inured us and deadened our collective sensitivity, but that does not reduce the enormity of the personal tragedy of each victim's family and community. The economic loss is only secondary to the human suffering, but is also substantial. The Government, whether State or Central, has standardised its response. This consists of reacting late, blaming others, visits by VIPs announcing a relief package including compensation for those affected, and then forgetting all about it.

There seems to be little attempt at drawing lessons from each disaster, storing the knowledge for future use, and long-term planning for possible pre-emptive action. Preparedness for disasters thus falls short of what is possible using today's technologies. Floods in many parts of India like the states of Bihar and Assam are a yearly phenomenon. Yet the government seems to be caught by surprise year after year. It is obvious that tarpaulins, vaccines and other medicines, clothes, satellite phones, large numbers of doctors and paramedical staff, etc will be needed as will boats and buses for evacuation. This is known to all those who have combated emergencies, yet the non-availability of these essential services and commodities occurs. Worse, the organisational structure and mechanisms for dealing with disasters are lethargic and ill-defined.

The National Disaster Management Agency set up a short time ago, being a Central Government agency, has its limitations relating to infringing the jurisdiction of states. It could have aggregated and disseminated experiences and knowledge, stocked many of the essential items required in an emergency or worked with agencies to ensure sufficient stocks, but hasn't. While the reaction to major disasters is dismal, the response to emergencies like accident is equally sad. Victims lie unattended since passers-by are wary of getting caught in a labyrinthine of police and legal systems. The resulting delay in treatment converts injuries into deaths. Of late, unique and free service to provide assistance in emergency cases is operational.

Emergency Management and Research institute (EMRI) is a professionally managed operation—initiated by the vision and grant from Ramalinga Raju. The service, which is a successful example of public-private partnership, is likely to become operational in a few states in the near future. Given the sad failure of conventional government organisations in handling disasters, it is time we looked at the PPP model as an alternative without the government seeking in any way to abdicate its responsibility. While the state provides the funding, private organisations will provide the drive, professionalism, competent management and output-linked efficiency of a good corporate organisation. Combining the sensitivity and purpose of an NGO with private entrepreneurial drive to handle disasters together is thus a worthwhile challenge for both corporates and the government?

We have witnessed several disasters in recent times—some natural, others man-made. The frequency of such calamities has inured us and deadened our collective sensitivity, but that does not reduce the enormity of the personal tragedy of each victim's family and community. The economic loss is only secondary to the human suffering, but is also substantial. The Government, whether State or Central, has standardised its response. This consists of reacting late, blaming others, visits by VIPs announcing a relief package including compensation for those affected, and then forgetting all about it.

There seems to be little attempt at drawing lessons from each disaster, storing the knowledge for future use, and long-term planning for possible pre-emptive action. Preparedness for disasters thus falls short of what is possible using today's technologies. Floods in many parts of India like the states of Bihar and Assam are a yearly phenomenon. Yet the government seems to be caught by surprise year after year. It is obvious that tarpaulins, vaccines and other medicines, clothes, satellite phones, large numbers of doctors and paramedical staff, etc will be needed as will boats and buses for evacuation. This is known to all those who have combated emergencies, yet the non-availability of these essential services and commodities occurs. Worse, the organisational structure and mechanisms for dealing with disasters are lethargic and ill-defined.

The National Disaster Management Agency set up a short time ago, being a Central Government agency, has its limitations relating to infringing the jurisdiction of states. It could have aggregated and disseminated experiences and knowledge, stocked many of the essential items required in an emergency or worked with agencies to ensure sufficient stocks, but hasn't. While the reaction to major disasters is dismal, the response to emergencies like accident is equally sad. Victims lie unattended since passers-by are wary of getting caught in a labyrinthine of police and legal systems. The resulting delay in treatment converts injuries into deaths. Of late, unique and free service to provide assistance in emergency cases is operational.

Emergency Management and Research institute (EMRI) is a professionally managed operation—initiated by the vision and grant from Ramalinga Raju. The service, which is a successful example of public-private partnership, is likely to become operational in a few states in the near future. Given the sad failure of conventional government organisations in handling disasters, it is time we looked at the PPP model as an alternative without the government seeking in any way to abdicate its responsibility. While the state provides the funding, private organisations will provide the drive, professionalism, competent management and output-linked efficiency of a good corporate organisation. Combining the sensitivity and purpose of an NGO with private entrepreneurial drive to handle disasters together is thus a worthwhile challenge for both corporates and the government?