Verbal Ability & Reading Comprehension (VARC) Test - 3

Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow:

Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow:

Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow:

Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

Read the following passage and answer the questions that follow:

Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

Read the passage given below and answer the following questions.

Here is an undeniable but seldom-stated fact: The quickest way to destroy terrorism as a tool would be to institute a news media policy of information blackout regarding terrorist attacks. The terrorist act itself only creates a few corpses (9/11 notwithstanding). But it is actually the dissemination of information which creates the state of terror among the population.

Of course, in the age of social media we could never implement such a policy. But it’s worth noting that our collective addiction to information — and the inability of for-profit media to pull itself away from ratings — that creates among the collective brain of our population, a deep susceptibility to be terrorized.

There is actually one way in which we already, tacitly recognize the role of media in creating and aiding terror. In the wake of mass shootings, assassination attempts, and other kinds of “high profile” acts, the media itself is sensitive to the role it plays in potentially spurring on “copycat” attacks. I’ve seen this kind of thing discussed since Columbine, and perhaps even before. Yet I’ve never seen anyone pull on the thread and unravel it all the way down to its core, to ask: “What if our media itself is the medium which makes mass terrorism possible?”

Media coverage is the oxygen that sustains this fire. Media does the terrorizing, more than any particular act. When Jihadi John slits a throat in a country on the other side of the world, how is his knife, and how is that throat, any different than the thousands of people around the world who are murdered by knives and bullets on a daily basis?

Our modern information dissemination structures themselves amplify this act and weave it into the fabric of our national story. We have come to rely on this legacy mechanism of “journalism” and “news reporting” for sense-making about the world. We’ve tacitly ceded control of narrative creation about our tribe from the priests over to a for-profit complex of radio, print, TV, web, etc. And this entire edifice — of top-down, broadcast synchrony of a singular, dominant narrative — has a particular failure mode. Since it has no explicit control (it is an emergent hive of activity), and since it has no actual architecture that would prevent it from catastrophic, systemic failure, it can get hijacked. Very easily.

That vulnerability, when exploited by jihadist groups, creates a standing wave pattern, namely, the fear of random acts of violence. But terrorism, by definition, is the creation of a state of fear or hysteria among a population. ISIL doesn’t operate any radio towers in the US, nor does it configure internet routers in our data centers. Jihadists kill people — that is true. But our media environment creates and sustains the sense of terror.

Read the passage given below and answer the following questions.

Here is an undeniable but seldom-stated fact: The quickest way to destroy terrorism as a tool would be to institute a news media policy of information blackout regarding terrorist attacks. The terrorist act itself only creates a few corpses (9/11 notwithstanding). But it is actually the dissemination of information which creates the state of terror among the population.

Of course, in the age of social media we could never implement such a policy. But it’s worth noting that our collective addiction to information — and the inability of for-profit media to pull itself away from ratings — that creates among the collective brain of our population, a deep susceptibility to be terrorized.

There is actually one way in which we already, tacitly recognize the role of media in creating and aiding terror. In the wake of mass shootings, assassination attempts, and other kinds of “high profile” acts, the media itself is sensitive to the role it plays in potentially spurring on “copycat” attacks. I’ve seen this kind of thing discussed since Columbine, and perhaps even before. Yet I’ve never seen anyone pull on the thread and unravel it all the way down to its core, to ask: “What if our media itself is the medium which makes mass terrorism possible?”

Media coverage is the oxygen that sustains this fire. Media does the terrorizing, more than any particular act. When Jihadi John slits a throat in a country on the other side of the world, how is his knife, and how is that throat, any different than the thousands of people around the world who are murdered by knives and bullets on a daily basis?

Our modern information dissemination structures themselves amplify this act and weave it into the fabric of our national story. We have come to rely on this legacy mechanism of “journalism” and “news reporting” for sense-making about the world. We’ve tacitly ceded control of narrative creation about our tribe from the priests over to a for-profit complex of radio, print, TV, web, etc. And this entire edifice — of top-down, broadcast synchrony of a singular, dominant narrative — has a particular failure mode. Since it has no explicit control (it is an emergent hive of activity), and since it has no actual architecture that would prevent it from catastrophic, systemic failure, it can get hijacked. Very easily.

That vulnerability, when exploited by jihadist groups, creates a standing wave pattern, namely, the fear of random acts of violence. But terrorism, by definition, is the creation of a state of fear or hysteria among a population. ISIL doesn’t operate any radio towers in the US, nor does it configure internet routers in our data centers. Jihadists kill people — that is true. But our media environment creates and sustains the sense of terror.

Read the passage given below and answer the following questions.

Here is an undeniable but seldom-stated fact: The quickest way to destroy terrorism as a tool would be to institute a news media policy of information blackout regarding terrorist attacks. The terrorist act itself only creates a few corpses (9/11 notwithstanding). But it is actually the dissemination of information which creates the state of terror among the population.

Of course, in the age of social media we could never implement such a policy. But it’s worth noting that our collective addiction to information — and the inability of for-profit media to pull itself away from ratings — that creates among the collective brain of our population, a deep susceptibility to be terrorized.

There is actually one way in which we already, tacitly recognize the role of media in creating and aiding terror. In the wake of mass shootings, assassination attempts, and other kinds of “high profile” acts, the media itself is sensitive to the role it plays in potentially spurring on “copycat” attacks. I’ve seen this kind of thing discussed since Columbine, and perhaps even before. Yet I’ve never seen anyone pull on the thread and unravel it all the way down to its core, to ask: “What if our media itself is the medium which makes mass terrorism possible?”

Media coverage is the oxygen that sustains this fire. Media does the terrorizing, more than any particular act. When Jihadi John slits a throat in a country on the other side of the world, how is his knife, and how is that throat, any different than the thousands of people around the world who are murdered by knives and bullets on a daily basis?

Our modern information dissemination structures themselves amplify this act and weave it into the fabric of our national story. We have come to rely on this legacy mechanism of “journalism” and “news reporting” for sense-making about the world. We’ve tacitly ceded control of narrative creation about our tribe from the priests over to a for-profit complex of radio, print, TV, web, etc. And this entire edifice — of top-down, broadcast synchrony of a singular, dominant narrative — has a particular failure mode. Since it has no explicit control (it is an emergent hive of activity), and since it has no actual architecture that would prevent it from catastrophic, systemic failure, it can get hijacked. Very easily.

That vulnerability, when exploited by jihadist groups, creates a standing wave pattern, namely, the fear of random acts of violence. But terrorism, by definition, is the creation of a state of fear or hysteria among a population. ISIL doesn’t operate any radio towers in the US, nor does it configure internet routers in our data centers. Jihadists kill people — that is true. But our media environment creates and sustains the sense of terror.

Read the passage given below and answer the following questions.

Here is an undeniable but seldom-stated fact: The quickest way to destroy terrorism as a tool would be to institute a news media policy of information blackout regarding terrorist attacks. The terrorist act itself only creates a few corpses (9/11 notwithstanding). But it is actually the dissemination of information which creates the state of terror among the population.

Of course, in the age of social media we could never implement such a policy. But it’s worth noting that our collective addiction to information — and the inability of for-profit media to pull itself away from ratings — that creates among the collective brain of our population, a deep susceptibility to be terrorized.

There is actually one way in which we already, tacitly recognize the role of media in creating and aiding terror. In the wake of mass shootings, assassination attempts, and other kinds of “high profile” acts, the media itself is sensitive to the role it plays in potentially spurring on “copycat” attacks. I’ve seen this kind of thing discussed since Columbine, and perhaps even before. Yet I’ve never seen anyone pull on the thread and unravel it all the way down to its core, to ask: “What if our media itself is the medium which makes mass terrorism possible?”

Media coverage is the oxygen that sustains this fire. Media does the terrorizing, more than any particular act. When Jihadi John slits a throat in a country on the other side of the world, how is his knife, and how is that throat, any different than the thousands of people around the world who are murdered by knives and bullets on a daily basis?

Our modern information dissemination structures themselves amplify this act and weave it into the fabric of our national story. We have come to rely on this legacy mechanism of “journalism” and “news reporting” for sense-making about the world. We’ve tacitly ceded control of narrative creation about our tribe from the priests over to a for-profit complex of radio, print, TV, web, etc. And this entire edifice — of top-down, broadcast synchrony of a singular, dominant narrative — has a particular failure mode. Since it has no explicit control (it is an emergent hive of activity), and since it has no actual architecture that would prevent it from catastrophic, systemic failure, it can get hijacked. Very easily.

That vulnerability, when exploited by jihadist groups, creates a standing wave pattern, namely, the fear of random acts of violence. But terrorism, by definition, is the creation of a state of fear or hysteria among a population. ISIL doesn’t operate any radio towers in the US, nor does it configure internet routers in our data centers. Jihadists kill people — that is true. But our media environment creates and sustains the sense of terror.

Read the passage and answer the questions that follow.

Discussions over misinformation, disinformation, and ‘fake news’ have reignited interest in news literacy. A wide range of different actors — from educators to technology companies — believe that raising news literacy would make people better able to separate fact from fiction, potentially limiting the spread of false information and leaving them better equipped to navigate partisan media environments. Others, however, have struck a note of caution by arguing that we need to think carefully about what news literacy should look like. In the past, news literacy largely meant teaching people to be sceptical or giving them ways of questioning the stories told by the mass media. How useful are such skills in a world where many believe that trust in institutions, including the news media, is already dangerously low?
The answer lies in considering the relationship between trust and news literacy. Many people hope that increasing overall levels of news literacy will reverse the decline in news trust we see in many countries as people will have better judgement. This sounds like a reasonable assumption, but news literacy may also go hand in hand with a high degree of scepticism. Even if we focus on news production, the more people know about how the news is made, the more knowledgeable they will be about its limitations and imperfections. This may be why we see only a very small increase in trust levels as news literacy increases.
We must also consider the possibility that those with higher levels of news literacy may rely less on social media for news, yet they appear to be more discerning when they do use it. When deciding whether to click through to a story, they are more likely to pay attention to a range of different credibility cues. Compared to those with lower levels of news literacy, they are more likely to say that the news brand, the headline, and the person who shared the story are important in deciding whether it is worth their time.
The exception to this rule is the number of comments, likes, or shares, which is the least important cue across all groups but is more important among those with the lowest level of news literacy. However, they are also less likely to share or comment on news themselves, so the simple idea that low-quality news is primarily spread by people with low news literacy may only be partly true. The use of social media for news has often been associated with more diverse news diets, increases in political participation, and modest depolarization of political attitudes. So as search engines and social media become more important to the news ecosystem, any attempt to raise news literacy should also aim to improve the knowledge of both the positive and negative outcomes.

Read the passage and answer the questions that follow.

Discussions over misinformation, disinformation, and ‘fake news’ have reignited interest in news literacy. A wide range of different actors — from educators to technology companies — believe that raising news literacy would make people better able to separate fact from fiction, potentially limiting the spread of false information and leaving them better equipped to navigate partisan media environments. Others, however, have struck a note of caution by arguing that we need to think carefully about what news literacy should look like. In the past, news literacy largely meant teaching people to be sceptical or giving them ways of questioning the stories told by the mass media. How useful are such skills in a world where many believe that trust in institutions, including the news media, is already dangerously low?
The answer lies in considering the relationship between trust and news literacy. Many people hope that increasing overall levels of news literacy will reverse the decline in news trust we see in many countries as people will have better judgement. This sounds like a reasonable assumption, but news literacy may also go hand in hand with a high degree of scepticism. Even if we focus on news production, the more people know about how the news is made, the more knowledgeable they will be about its limitations and imperfections. This may be why we see only a very small increase in trust levels as news literacy increases.
We must also consider the possibility that those with higher levels of news literacy may rely less on social media for news, yet they appear to be more discerning when they do use it. When deciding whether to click through to a story, they are more likely to pay attention to a range of different credibility cues. Compared to those with lower levels of news literacy, they are more likely to say that the news brand, the headline, and the person who shared the story are important in deciding whether it is worth their time.
The exception to this rule is the number of comments, likes, or shares, which is the least important cue across all groups but is more important among those with the lowest level of news literacy. However, they are also less likely to share or comment on news themselves, so the simple idea that low-quality news is primarily spread by people with low news literacy may only be partly true. The use of social media for news has often been associated with more diverse news diets, increases in political participation, and modest depolarization of political attitudes. So as search engines and social media become more important to the news ecosystem, any attempt to raise news literacy should also aim to improve the knowledge of both the positive and negative outcomes.

Read the passage and answer the questions that follow.

Discussions over misinformation, disinformation, and ‘fake news’ have reignited interest in news literacy. A wide range of different actors — from educators to technology companies — believe that raising news literacy would make people better able to separate fact from fiction, potentially limiting the spread of false information and leaving them better equipped to navigate partisan media environments. Others, however, have struck a note of caution by arguing that we need to think carefully about what news literacy should look like. In the past, news literacy largely meant teaching people to be sceptical or giving them ways of questioning the stories told by the mass media. How useful are such skills in a world where many believe that trust in institutions, including the news media, is already dangerously low?
The answer lies in considering the relationship between trust and news literacy. Many people hope that increasing overall levels of news literacy will reverse the decline in news trust we see in many countries as people will have better judgement. This sounds like a reasonable assumption, but news literacy may also go hand in hand with a high degree of scepticism. Even if we focus on news production, the more people know about how the news is made, the more knowledgeable they will be about its limitations and imperfections. This may be why we see only a very small increase in trust levels as news literacy increases.
We must also consider the possibility that those with higher levels of news literacy may rely less on social media for news, yet they appear to be more discerning when they do use it. When deciding whether to click through to a story, they are more likely to pay attention to a range of different credibility cues. Compared to those with lower levels of news literacy, they are more likely to say that the news brand, the headline, and the person who shared the story are important in deciding whether it is worth their time.
The exception to this rule is the number of comments, likes, or shares, which is the least important cue across all groups but is more important among those with the lowest level of news literacy. However, they are also less likely to share or comment on news themselves, so the simple idea that low-quality news is primarily spread by people with low news literacy may only be partly true. The use of social media for news has often been associated with more diverse news diets, increases in political participation, and modest depolarization of political attitudes. So as search engines and social media become more important to the news ecosystem, any attempt to raise news literacy should also aim to improve the knowledge of both the positive and negative outcomes.

Read the passage and answer the questions that follow.

Discussions over misinformation, disinformation, and ‘fake news’ have reignited interest in news literacy. A wide range of different actors — from educators to technology companies — believe that raising news literacy would make people better able to separate fact from fiction, potentially limiting the spread of false information and leaving them better equipped to navigate partisan media environments. Others, however, have struck a note of caution by arguing that we need to think carefully about what news literacy should look like. In the past, news literacy largely meant teaching people to be sceptical or giving them ways of questioning the stories told by the mass media. How useful are such skills in a world where many believe that trust in institutions, including the news media, is already dangerously low?
The answer lies in considering the relationship between trust and news literacy. Many people hope that increasing overall levels of news literacy will reverse the decline in news trust we see in many countries as people will have better judgement. This sounds like a reasonable assumption, but news literacy may also go hand in hand with a high degree of scepticism. Even if we focus on news production, the more people know about how the news is made, the more knowledgeable they will be about its limitations and imperfections. This may be why we see only a very small increase in trust levels as news literacy increases.
We must also consider the possibility that those with higher levels of news literacy may rely less on social media for news, yet they appear to be more discerning when they do use it. When deciding whether to click through to a story, they are more likely to pay attention to a range of different credibility cues. Compared to those with lower levels of news literacy, they are more likely to say that the news brand, the headline, and the person who shared the story are important in deciding whether it is worth their time.
The exception to this rule is the number of comments, likes, or shares, which is the least important cue across all groups but is more important among those with the lowest level of news literacy. However, they are also less likely to share or comment on news themselves, so the simple idea that low-quality news is primarily spread by people with low news literacy may only be partly true. The use of social media for news has often been associated with more diverse news diets, increases in political participation, and modest depolarization of political attitudes. So as search engines and social media become more important to the news ecosystem, any attempt to raise news literacy should also aim to improve the knowledge of both the positive and negative outcomes.

Read the passage and answer the questions that follow.

Discussions over misinformation, disinformation, and ‘fake news’ have reignited interest in news literacy. A wide range of different actors — from educators to technology companies — believe that raising news literacy would make people better able to separate fact from fiction, potentially limiting the spread of false information and leaving them better equipped to navigate partisan media environments. Others, however, have struck a note of caution by arguing that we need to think carefully about what news literacy should look like. In the past, news literacy largely meant teaching people to be sceptical or giving them ways of questioning the stories told by the mass media. How useful are such skills in a world where many believe that trust in institutions, including the news media, is already dangerously low?
The answer lies in considering the relationship between trust and news literacy. Many people hope that increasing overall levels of news literacy will reverse the decline in news trust we see in many countries as people will have better judgement. This sounds like a reasonable assumption, but news literacy may also go hand in hand with a high degree of scepticism. Even if we focus on news production, the more people know about how the news is made, the more knowledgeable they will be about its limitations and imperfections. This may be why we see only a very small increase in trust levels as news literacy increases.
We must also consider the possibility that those with higher levels of news literacy may rely less on social media for news, yet they appear to be more discerning when they do use it. When deciding whether to click through to a story, they are more likely to pay attention to a range of different credibility cues. Compared to those with lower levels of news literacy, they are more likely to say that the news brand, the headline, and the person who shared the story are important in deciding whether it is worth their time.
The exception to this rule is the number of comments, likes, or shares, which is the least important cue across all groups but is more important among those with the lowest level of news literacy. However, they are also less likely to share or comment on news themselves, so the simple idea that low-quality news is primarily spread by people with low news literacy may only be partly true. The use of social media for news has often been associated with more diverse news diets, increases in political participation, and modest depolarization of political attitudes. So as search engines and social media become more important to the news ecosystem, any attempt to raise news literacy should also aim to improve the knowledge of both the positive and negative outcomes.

Read the following passage and answer the set of five questions that follow.

Those who speak out against bad treatment are often dismissed as ‘playing the victim’, accused of dwelling on imagined slights or indulging in an exaggerated sense of grievance. In the face of ridicule or, worse, the threat of violence, it would be easier to keep quiet. And yet, victims of injustice often do speak up: far from any desire for glory, they are often morally motivated, and act from a sense of duty.
Someone who is subjected to demeaning treatment might owe it to herself to protest and to undermine the apparatus of assumptions, stereotypes and norms that enable this treatment. But, importantly, she might also owe it to others who are vulnerable to similar treatment - fellow victims - to resist the injustices they face collectively and repeatedly. This is especially the case for what the US political theorist Iris Marion Young in 2003 called structural injustices, which are perpetuated through seemingly benign institutions, everyday practices, background assumptions and expected behaviours. Even where there is no explicit discriminatory policy, in fact when such discrimination is publicly, repeatedly and earnestly disavowed, oppression on the basis of, for example, class, race and sex prevails.
Such structural injustice is manifested in a number of ways, from lower life expectancies and the prevalence of sexual and intimate partner violence, to the perception of diminished competence in the workplace and casual condescension in conversation. Structural injustice is typically characterised by ambiguity. It is often unclear whether a particular interaction is, in fact, a manifestation of structural injustice. It is also unclear how to delineate between perpetrators, bystanders and victims, given that so many of the mechanisms of structural injustice are unconscious, driven by social norms as much as by individuals, such that victims can be complicit in their own oppression, and that victims of one form of injustice can be perpetrators of another. And finally, it is unclear what a remedy would consist of.
The insidiousness of structural injustice rests on this ambiguity. Often, there is no intentional wrongdoing as such; perpetrators are unaware of their wrongdoing, and might genuinely disavow the values and norms implicit in their conduct. To bystanders, nothing noteworthy has taken place. The insult is unseen and unheard - except perhaps by those on the receiving end. In such cases, victims are epistemically privileged: they are aware that some set of seemingly benign norms or behaviour are in fact wrongs, they are aware that these norms might be harmful, and they notice when this harm is being done. In effect, they might be the only bystanders aware of the wrongdoing and therefore in a position to seek a remedy; in such cases, they will have a prima facie duty to do so. Unlike self-regarding duties, this duty is owed primarily to the class of victims, actual and prospective, who face wrongful treatment. For well-meaning but fallible individuals aiming to do right, victims potentially play a crucial role in helping them realise that aim; for fellow victims, they are collaborators in curing unjust practices and institutions.

Read the following passage and answer the set of five questions that follow.

Those who speak out against bad treatment are often dismissed as ‘playing the victim’, accused of dwelling on imagined slights or indulging in an exaggerated sense of grievance. In the face of ridicule or, worse, the threat of violence, it would be easier to keep quiet. And yet, victims of injustice often do speak up: far from any desire for glory, they are often morally motivated, and act from a sense of duty.
Someone who is subjected to demeaning treatment might owe it to herself to protest and to undermine the apparatus of assumptions, stereotypes and norms that enable this treatment. But, importantly, she might also owe it to others who are vulnerable to similar treatment - fellow victims - to resist the injustices they face collectively and repeatedly. This is especially the case for what the US political theorist Iris Marion Young in 2003 called structural injustices, which are perpetuated through seemingly benign institutions, everyday practices, background assumptions and expected behaviours. Even where there is no explicit discriminatory policy, in fact when such discrimination is publicly, repeatedly and earnestly disavowed, oppression on the basis of, for example, class, race and sex prevails.
Such structural injustice is manifested in a number of ways, from lower life expectancies and the prevalence of sexual and intimate partner violence, to the perception of diminished competence in the workplace and casual condescension in conversation. Structural injustice is typically characterised by ambiguity. It is often unclear whether a particular interaction is, in fact, a manifestation of structural injustice. It is also unclear how to delineate between perpetrators, bystanders and victims, given that so many of the mechanisms of structural injustice are unconscious, driven by social norms as much as by individuals, such that victims can be complicit in their own oppression, and that victims of one form of injustice can be perpetrators of another. And finally, it is unclear what a remedy would consist of.
The insidiousness of structural injustice rests on this ambiguity. Often, there is no intentional wrongdoing as such; perpetrators are unaware of their wrongdoing, and might genuinely disavow the values and norms implicit in their conduct. To bystanders, nothing noteworthy has taken place. The insult is unseen and unheard - except perhaps by those on the receiving end. In such cases, victims are epistemically privileged: they are aware that some set of seemingly benign norms or behaviour are in fact wrongs, they are aware that these norms might be harmful, and they notice when this harm is being done. In effect, they might be the only bystanders aware of the wrongdoing and therefore in a position to seek a remedy; in such cases, they will have a prima facie duty to do so. Unlike self-regarding duties, this duty is owed primarily to the class of victims, actual and prospective, who face wrongful treatment. For well-meaning but fallible individuals aiming to do right, victims potentially play a crucial role in helping them realise that aim; for fellow victims, they are collaborators in curing unjust practices and institutions.

Read the following passage and answer the set of five questions that follow.

Those who speak out against bad treatment are often dismissed as ‘playing the victim’, accused of dwelling on imagined slights or indulging in an exaggerated sense of grievance. In the face of ridicule or, worse, the threat of violence, it would be easier to keep quiet. And yet, victims of injustice often do speak up: far from any desire for glory, they are often morally motivated, and act from a sense of duty.
Someone who is subjected to demeaning treatment might owe it to herself to protest and to undermine the apparatus of assumptions, stereotypes and norms that enable this treatment. But, importantly, she might also owe it to others who are vulnerable to similar treatment - fellow victims - to resist the injustices they face collectively and repeatedly. This is especially the case for what the US political theorist Iris Marion Young in 2003 called structural injustices, which are perpetuated through seemingly benign institutions, everyday practices, background assumptions and expected behaviours. Even where there is no explicit discriminatory policy, in fact when such discrimination is publicly, repeatedly and earnestly disavowed, oppression on the basis of, for example, class, race and sex prevails.
Such structural injustice is manifested in a number of ways, from lower life expectancies and the prevalence of sexual and intimate partner violence, to the perception of diminished competence in the workplace and casual condescension in conversation. Structural injustice is typically characterised by ambiguity. It is often unclear whether a particular interaction is, in fact, a manifestation of structural injustice. It is also unclear how to delineate between perpetrators, bystanders and victims, given that so many of the mechanisms of structural injustice are unconscious, driven by social norms as much as by individuals, such that victims can be complicit in their own oppression, and that victims of one form of injustice can be perpetrators of another. And finally, it is unclear what a remedy would consist of.
The insidiousness of structural injustice rests on this ambiguity. Often, there is no intentional wrongdoing as such; perpetrators are unaware of their wrongdoing, and might genuinely disavow the values and norms implicit in their conduct. To bystanders, nothing noteworthy has taken place. The insult is unseen and unheard - except perhaps by those on the receiving end. In such cases, victims are epistemically privileged: they are aware that some set of seemingly benign norms or behaviour are in fact wrongs, they are aware that these norms might be harmful, and they notice when this harm is being done. In effect, they might be the only bystanders aware of the wrongdoing and therefore in a position to seek a remedy; in such cases, they will have a prima facie duty to do so. Unlike self-regarding duties, this duty is owed primarily to the class of victims, actual and prospective, who face wrongful treatment. For well-meaning but fallible individuals aiming to do right, victims potentially play a crucial role in helping them realise that aim; for fellow victims, they are collaborators in curing unjust practices and institutions.

Read the following passage and answer the set of five questions that follow.

Those who speak out against bad treatment are often dismissed as ‘playing the victim’, accused of dwelling on imagined slights or indulging in an exaggerated sense of grievance. In the face of ridicule or, worse, the threat of violence, it would be easier to keep quiet. And yet, victims of injustice often do speak up: far from any desire for glory, they are often morally motivated, and act from a sense of duty.
Someone who is subjected to demeaning treatment might owe it to herself to protest and to undermine the apparatus of assumptions, stereotypes and norms that enable this treatment. But, importantly, she might also owe it to others who are vulnerable to similar treatment - fellow victims - to resist the injustices they face collectively and repeatedly. This is especially the case for what the US political theorist Iris Marion Young in 2003 called structural injustices, which are perpetuated through seemingly benign institutions, everyday practices, background assumptions and expected behaviours. Even where there is no explicit discriminatory policy, in fact when such discrimination is publicly, repeatedly and earnestly disavowed, oppression on the basis of, for example, class, race and sex prevails.
Such structural injustice is manifested in a number of ways, from lower life expectancies and the prevalence of sexual and intimate partner violence, to the perception of diminished competence in the workplace and casual condescension in conversation. Structural injustice is typically characterised by ambiguity. It is often unclear whether a particular interaction is, in fact, a manifestation of structural injustice. It is also unclear how to delineate between perpetrators, bystanders and victims, given that so many of the mechanisms of structural injustice are unconscious, driven by social norms as much as by individuals, such that victims can be complicit in their own oppression, and that victims of one form of injustice can be perpetrators of another. And finally, it is unclear what a remedy would consist of.
The insidiousness of structural injustice rests on this ambiguity. Often, there is no intentional wrongdoing as such; perpetrators are unaware of their wrongdoing, and might genuinely disavow the values and norms implicit in their conduct. To bystanders, nothing noteworthy has taken place. The insult is unseen and unheard - except perhaps by those on the receiving end. In such cases, victims are epistemically privileged: they are aware that some set of seemingly benign norms or behaviour are in fact wrongs, they are aware that these norms might be harmful, and they notice when this harm is being done. In effect, they might be the only bystanders aware of the wrongdoing and therefore in a position to seek a remedy; in such cases, they will have a prima facie duty to do so. Unlike self-regarding duties, this duty is owed primarily to the class of victims, actual and prospective, who face wrongful treatment. For well-meaning but fallible individuals aiming to do right, victims potentially play a crucial role in helping them realise that aim; for fellow victims, they are collaborators in curing unjust practices and institutions.

Read the following passage and answer the set of five questions that follow.

Those who speak out against bad treatment are often dismissed as ‘playing the victim’, accused of dwelling on imagined slights or indulging in an exaggerated sense of grievance. In the face of ridicule or, worse, the threat of violence, it would be easier to keep quiet. And yet, victims of injustice often do speak up: far from any desire for glory, they are often morally motivated, and act from a sense of duty.
Someone who is subjected to demeaning treatment might owe it to herself to protest and to undermine the apparatus of assumptions, stereotypes and norms that enable this treatment. But, importantly, she might also owe it to others who are vulnerable to similar treatment - fellow victims - to resist the injustices they face collectively and repeatedly. This is especially the case for what the US political theorist Iris Marion Young in 2003 called structural injustices, which are perpetuated through seemingly benign institutions, everyday practices, background assumptions and expected behaviours. Even where there is no explicit discriminatory policy, in fact when such discrimination is publicly, repeatedly and earnestly disavowed, oppression on the basis of, for example, class, race and sex prevails.
Such structural injustice is manifested in a number of ways, from lower life expectancies and the prevalence of sexual and intimate partner violence, to the perception of diminished competence in the workplace and casual condescension in conversation. Structural injustice is typically characterised by ambiguity. It is often unclear whether a particular interaction is, in fact, a manifestation of structural injustice. It is also unclear how to delineate between perpetrators, bystanders and victims, given that so many of the mechanisms of structural injustice are unconscious, driven by social norms as much as by individuals, such that victims can be complicit in their own oppression, and that victims of one form of injustice can be perpetrators of another. And finally, it is unclear what a remedy would consist of.
The insidiousness of structural injustice rests on this ambiguity. Often, there is no intentional wrongdoing as such; perpetrators are unaware of their wrongdoing, and might genuinely disavow the values and norms implicit in their conduct. To bystanders, nothing noteworthy has taken place. The insult is unseen and unheard - except perhaps by those on the receiving end. In such cases, victims are epistemically privileged: they are aware that some set of seemingly benign norms or behaviour are in fact wrongs, they are aware that these norms might be harmful, and they notice when this harm is being done. In effect, they might be the only bystanders aware of the wrongdoing and therefore in a position to seek a remedy; in such cases, they will have a prima facie duty to do so. Unlike self-regarding duties, this duty is owed primarily to the class of victims, actual and prospective, who face wrongful treatment. For well-meaning but fallible individuals aiming to do right, victims potentially play a crucial role in helping them realise that aim; for fellow victims, they are collaborators in curing unjust practices and institutions.