Verbal Ability Test - 4

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

It is one of the most widespread and characteristic beliefs among students today, that our times are so unique, so unlike anything which has been known before, that study of the past is of no value, is irrelevant' (Dumoulin 1973: vi)
The eminent historical comparativist, Karl Polanyi believed that the great transformation that
occurred in the course of the world wars -- from free unregulated markets to welfare states --represented
a permanent change, both in the nature of the international system, as well as in its constituent states. But
Polanyi did not live to see the beginning of the rise, once again, of the 'unregulated' market. Had he
done so, he perhaps would have seen the rise and demise of Europe's nineteenth-century system, not as a
once-and-for-all occurrence, but as part of an on-going struggle over the distribution of costs and
benefits of industrial capitalism. It is a struggle, previous sections suggest, that continues today.
Though the free market and the laissez-faire state gave way, in varying degrees, to regulated
markets and interventionist states after World War II, the liberal international order survived. The hybrid
system that this created has been characterized as one of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982).
It was, in fact, Polanyi's analysis of Europe's nineteenth century market system (in The Great
Transformation, 1944) that inspired the notion of markets as embedded and dis-embedded. Polanyi
iargued that, before the rise of the unregulated market system at the end of the eighteenth century,
exchange relations were governed by principles of economic behavior (reciprocity, reallocation, and
house-holding) that were 'embedded' in society and politics. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, states began to institute changes that formed the basis of the dis-embedded capitalist development that characterized Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion.

The collapse of the nineteenth century system and the conclusion of a 'compromise' between capital and labour, led to the re-embedding of European economies after 1945. Welfare reforms partially de-commodified labour, and by means of market and industry regulation, investment and production were made to serve the expansion and integration of national markets. Now, however, a campaign to promote the dispersal of capital investment and production to foreign locations--the current 'globalisation' campaign--is seeking to reverse the post-World War II compromise and to dis-embed national markets, once again.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. This paper endeavors to bring this history to bear on what may be the beginning of another iteration of a recurring process of accelerated capitalist globalization. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what this history can illuminate about the nature and the consequences, both at home and abroad, of imperialism today and the processes of globalisation associated with it. Only by delineating the continuities and points of contact between the present and recent past history of imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalisation and the new imperialism', and other supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalisation is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalisation of capital- a process that has been on-going for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation. The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentalities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized, like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center. In developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contrary to Martin Shaw's assertion that 'since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states') Hobson's theory of imperialism continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what Was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. Only by delineating the continuities and points of Contact between the present and recent past history of Imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalization and the 'new imperialism', and other Supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalization is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalization of capital-a process that has been ongoing for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentaities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center, in developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contra to Main Shaw's assertion that 'Since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states')Hobson's of imperialism Continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

It is one of the most widespread and characteristic beliefs among students today, that our times are so unique, so unlike anything which has been known before, that study of the past is of no value, is irrelevant' (Dumoulin 1973: vi)
The eminent historical comparativist, Karl Polanyi believed that the great transformation that
occurred in the course of the world wars -- from free unregulated markets to welfare states --represented
a permanent change, both in the nature of the international system, as well as in its constituent states. But
Polanyi did not live to see the beginning of the rise, once again, of the 'unregulated' market. Had he
done so, he perhaps would have seen the rise and demise of Europe's nineteenth-century system, not as a
once-and-for-all occurrence, but as part of an on-going struggle over the distribution of costs and
benefits of industrial capitalism. It is a struggle, previous sections suggest, that continues today.
Though the free market and the laissez-faire state gave way, in varying degrees, to regulated
markets and interventionist states after World War II, the liberal international order survived. The hybrid
system that this created has been characterized as one of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982).
It was, in fact, Polanyi's analysis of Europe's nineteenth century market system (in The Great
Transformation, 1944) that inspired the notion of markets as embedded and dis-embedded. Polanyi
iargued that, before the rise of the unregulated market system at the end of the eighteenth century,
exchange relations were governed by principles of economic behavior (reciprocity, reallocation, and
house-holding) that were 'embedded' in society and politics. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, states began to institute changes that formed the basis of the dis-embedded capitalist development that characterized Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion.

The collapse of the nineteenth century system and the conclusion of a 'compromise' between capital and labour, led to the re-embedding of European economies after 1945. Welfare reforms partially de-commodified labour, and by means of market and industry regulation, investment and production were made to serve the expansion and integration of national markets. Now, however, a campaign to promote the dispersal of capital investment and production to foreign locations--the current 'globalisation' campaign--is seeking to reverse the post-World War II compromise and to dis-embed national markets, once again.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. This paper endeavors to bring this history to bear on what may be the beginning of another iteration of a recurring process of accelerated capitalist globalization. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what this history can illuminate about the nature and the consequences, both at home and abroad, of imperialism today and the processes of globalisation associated with it. Only by delineating the continuities and points of contact between the present and recent past history of imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalisation and the new imperialism', and other supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalisation is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalisation of capital- a process that has been on-going for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation. The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentalities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized, like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center. In developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contrary to Martin Shaw's assertion that 'since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states') Hobson's theory of imperialism continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what Was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. Only by delineating the continuities and points of Contact between the present and recent past history of Imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalization and the 'new imperialism', and other Supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalization is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalization of capital-a process that has been ongoing for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentaities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center, in developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contra to Main Shaw's assertion that 'Since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states')Hobson's of imperialism Continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

It is one of the most widespread and characteristic beliefs among students today, that our times are so unique, so unlike anything which has been known before, that study of the past is of no value, is irrelevant' (Dumoulin 1973: vi)
The eminent historical comparativist, Karl Polanyi believed that the great transformation that
occurred in the course of the world wars -- from free unregulated markets to welfare states --represented
a permanent change, both in the nature of the international system, as well as in its constituent states. But
Polanyi did not live to see the beginning of the rise, once again, of the 'unregulated' market. Had he
done so, he perhaps would have seen the rise and demise of Europe's nineteenth-century system, not as a
once-and-for-all occurrence, but as part of an on-going struggle over the distribution of costs and
benefits of industrial capitalism. It is a struggle, previous sections suggest, that continues today.
Though the free market and the laissez-faire state gave way, in varying degrees, to regulated
markets and interventionist states after World War II, the liberal international order survived. The hybrid
system that this created has been characterized as one of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982).
It was, in fact, Polanyi's analysis of Europe's nineteenth century market system (in The Great
Transformation, 1944) that inspired the notion of markets as embedded and dis-embedded. Polanyi
iargued that, before the rise of the unregulated market system at the end of the eighteenth century,
exchange relations were governed by principles of economic behavior (reciprocity, reallocation, and
house-holding) that were 'embedded' in society and politics. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, states began to institute changes that formed the basis of the dis-embedded capitalist development that characterized Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion.

The collapse of the nineteenth century system and the conclusion of a 'compromise' between capital and labour, led to the re-embedding of European economies after 1945. Welfare reforms partially de-commodified labour, and by means of market and industry regulation, investment and production were made to serve the expansion and integration of national markets. Now, however, a campaign to promote the dispersal of capital investment and production to foreign locations--the current 'globalisation' campaign--is seeking to reverse the post-World War II compromise and to dis-embed national markets, once again.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. This paper endeavors to bring this history to bear on what may be the beginning of another iteration of a recurring process of accelerated capitalist globalization. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what this history can illuminate about the nature and the consequences, both at home and abroad, of imperialism today and the processes of globalisation associated with it. Only by delineating the continuities and points of contact between the present and recent past history of imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalisation and the new imperialism', and other supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalisation is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalisation of capital- a process that has been on-going for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation. The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentalities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized, like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center. In developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contrary to Martin Shaw's assertion that 'since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states') Hobson's theory of imperialism continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what Was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. Only by delineating the continuities and points of Contact between the present and recent past history of Imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalization and the 'new imperialism', and other Supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalization is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalization of capital-a process that has been ongoing for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentaities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center, in developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contra to Main Shaw's assertion that 'Since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states')Hobson's of imperialism Continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

It is one of the most widespread and characteristic beliefs among students today, that our times are so unique, so unlike anything which has been known before, that study of the past is of no value, is irrelevant' (Dumoulin 1973: vi)
The eminent historical comparativist, Karl Polanyi believed that the great transformation that
occurred in the course of the world wars -- from free unregulated markets to welfare states --represented
a permanent change, both in the nature of the international system, as well as in its constituent states. But
Polanyi did not live to see the beginning of the rise, once again, of the 'unregulated' market. Had he
done so, he perhaps would have seen the rise and demise of Europe's nineteenth-century system, not as a
once-and-for-all occurrence, but as part of an on-going struggle over the distribution of costs and
benefits of industrial capitalism. It is a struggle, previous sections suggest, that continues today.
Though the free market and the laissez-faire state gave way, in varying degrees, to regulated
markets and interventionist states after World War II, the liberal international order survived. The hybrid
system that this created has been characterized as one of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982).
It was, in fact, Polanyi's analysis of Europe's nineteenth century market system (in The Great
Transformation, 1944) that inspired the notion of markets as embedded and dis-embedded. Polanyi
iargued that, before the rise of the unregulated market system at the end of the eighteenth century,
exchange relations were governed by principles of economic behavior (reciprocity, reallocation, and
house-holding) that were 'embedded' in society and politics. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, states began to institute changes that formed the basis of the dis-embedded capitalist development that characterized Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion.

The collapse of the nineteenth century system and the conclusion of a 'compromise' between capital and labour, led to the re-embedding of European economies after 1945. Welfare reforms partially de-commodified labour, and by means of market and industry regulation, investment and production were made to serve the expansion and integration of national markets. Now, however, a campaign to promote the dispersal of capital investment and production to foreign locations--the current 'globalisation' campaign--is seeking to reverse the post-World War II compromise and to dis-embed national markets, once again.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. This paper endeavors to bring this history to bear on what may be the beginning of another iteration of a recurring process of accelerated capitalist globalization. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what this history can illuminate about the nature and the consequences, both at home and abroad, of imperialism today and the processes of globalisation associated with it. Only by delineating the continuities and points of contact between the present and recent past history of imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalisation and the new imperialism', and other supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalisation is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalisation of capital- a process that has been on-going for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation. The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentalities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized, like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center. In developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contrary to Martin Shaw's assertion that 'since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states') Hobson's theory of imperialism continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what Was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. Only by delineating the continuities and points of Contact between the present and recent past history of Imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalization and the 'new imperialism', and other Supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalization is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalization of capital-a process that has been ongoing for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentaities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center, in developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contra to Main Shaw's assertion that 'Since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states')Hobson's of imperialism Continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

It is one of the most widespread and characteristic beliefs among students today, that our times are so unique, so unlike anything which has been known before, that study of the past is of no value, is irrelevant' (Dumoulin 1973: vi)
The eminent historical comparativist, Karl Polanyi believed that the great transformation that
occurred in the course of the world wars -- from free unregulated markets to welfare states --represented
a permanent change, both in the nature of the international system, as well as in its constituent states. But
Polanyi did not live to see the beginning of the rise, once again, of the 'unregulated' market. Had he
done so, he perhaps would have seen the rise and demise of Europe's nineteenth-century system, not as a
once-and-for-all occurrence, but as part of an on-going struggle over the distribution of costs and
benefits of industrial capitalism. It is a struggle, previous sections suggest, that continues today.
Though the free market and the laissez-faire state gave way, in varying degrees, to regulated
markets and interventionist states after World War II, the liberal international order survived. The hybrid
system that this created has been characterized as one of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982).
It was, in fact, Polanyi's analysis of Europe's nineteenth century market system (in The Great
Transformation, 1944) that inspired the notion of markets as embedded and dis-embedded. Polanyi
iargued that, before the rise of the unregulated market system at the end of the eighteenth century,
exchange relations were governed by principles of economic behavior (reciprocity, reallocation, and
house-holding) that were 'embedded' in society and politics. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, states began to institute changes that formed the basis of the dis-embedded capitalist development that characterized Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion.

The collapse of the nineteenth century system and the conclusion of a 'compromise' between capital and labour, led to the re-embedding of European economies after 1945. Welfare reforms partially de-commodified labour, and by means of market and industry regulation, investment and production were made to serve the expansion and integration of national markets. Now, however, a campaign to promote the dispersal of capital investment and production to foreign locations--the current 'globalisation' campaign--is seeking to reverse the post-World War II compromise and to dis-embed national markets, once again.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. This paper endeavors to bring this history to bear on what may be the beginning of another iteration of a recurring process of accelerated capitalist globalization. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what this history can illuminate about the nature and the consequences, both at home and abroad, of imperialism today and the processes of globalisation associated with it. Only by delineating the continuities and points of contact between the present and recent past history of imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalisation and the new imperialism', and other supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalisation is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalisation of capital- a process that has been on-going for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation. The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentalities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized, like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center. In developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contrary to Martin Shaw's assertion that 'since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states') Hobson's theory of imperialism continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what Was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. Only by delineating the continuities and points of Contact between the present and recent past history of Imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalization and the 'new imperialism', and other Supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalization is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalization of capital-a process that has been ongoing for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentaities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center, in developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contra to Main Shaw's assertion that 'Since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states')Hobson's of imperialism Continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.