Language Compre...

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

It is one of the most widespread and characteristic beliefs among students today, that our times are so unique, so unlike anything which has been known before, that study of the past is of no value, is irrelevant' (Dumoulin 1973: vi)

The eminent historical comparativist, Karl Polanyi believed that the great transformation that occurred in the course of the world wars -- from free unregulated markets to welfare states --represented a permanent change, both in the nature of the international system, as well as in its  constituent states. But Polanyi did not live to see the beginning of the rise, once again, of the 'unregulated' market. Had he done so, he perhaps would have seen the rise and demise of Europe's nineteenth-century system, not as a once-and-for-all occurrence, but as part of an on-going struggle over the distribution of costs and benefits of industrial capitalism. It is a struggle, previous sections suggest, that continues today.

Though the free market and the laissez-faire state gave way, in varying degrees, to regulated markets and interventionist states after World War II, the liberal international order survived. The hybrid system that this created has been characterized as one of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982). It was, in fact, Polanyi's analysis of Europe's nineteenth century market system (in The Great Transformation, 1944) that inspired the notion of markets as embedded and dis-embedded. Polanyi iargued that, before the rise of the unregulated market system at the end of the eighteenth century, exchange relations were governed by principles of economic behavior (reciprocity, reallocation, and house-holding) that were 'embedded' in society and politics. At the end of the eighteenth century,

however, states began to institute changes that formed the basis of the dis-embedded capitalist development that characterized Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion.

The collapse of the nineteenth century system and the conclusion of a 'compromise' between capital and labour, led to the re-embedding of European economies after 1945. Welfare reforms partially de-commodified labour, and by means of market and industry regulation, investment and production were made to serve the expansion and integration of national markets. Now, however, a campaign to promote the dispersal of capital investment and production to foreign locations--the current

'globalisation' campaign--is seeking to reverse the post-World War II compromise and to dis-embed national markets, once again. Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. This paper endeavors to bring this history to bear on what may be the beginning of another iteration of a recurring process of accelerated capitalist globalization. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what this history can illuminate about the nature and the consequences, both at home and abroad, of imperialism today and the processes of globalisation associated with it. Only by delineating the continuities and points of contact between the present and recent past history of imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalisation and the new imperialism', and other supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalisation is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalisation of capital- a process that has been on-going for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation. The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentalities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized, like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center. In developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contrary to Martin Shaw's assertion that 'since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states') Hobson's theory of imperialism continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what Was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. Only by delineating the continuities and points of Contact between the present and recent past history of Imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalization and the 'new imperialism', and other Supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalization is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalization of capital-a process that has been ongoing for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentaities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center, in developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contra to Main Shaw's assertion that 'Since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states')Hobson's of imperialism Continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

Choking off the money that funds terrorism sounded, after September 11th, like a neat and peaceable way to help prevent future attacks. After all, a large part of what was discovered about the identity of the 19 hijackers came from following the money they spent on flight schools, rent and plane tickets. Since then, America and Europe have frozen the assets of dozens of suspected funders of terrorism. Through the United Nations as well as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international body tackling money-laundering, they have put pressure on countries to pass legislation to outlaw the financing of terrorism. How effectively?

There is already evidence that terrorist activity has been disrupted to a certain extent due to increased financial scrutiny. On the other hand, according to a UN official, the flow of funds to Al-Qaeda from charities in Saudi Arabia has not yet ceased. America has put nine Islamic charities on its list organizations that fund terrorism, such as domestic branches of the Benevolence International Foundation. Yet the charities are small compared with those that operate in Saudi Arabia under the protection of the government, says Nawaf Obaid, an oil and security analyst. Despite, the flurry of law-making, most countries, including the G7, do not yet obey the eight new rules on terrorist financing that the FATF proposed last autumn. In America's case, this is partly a legacy from before September 11th, when it failed to observe a good number of the task-force's earlier rules against money-laundering. In its assessment of how closely it follows the new recommendations, America admits that insurance companies, stockbrokers and bureaux de change do not have to report suspicious transactions, though brokers will soon have to. Even if America's regime against terrorist financing were impregnable within its own borders terrorists could still take advantage of its links with countries that take a laxer attitude.

With this kind of background, FATF has found it difficult to enforce the eight rules, and the task-force is unlikely to begin a process, as it planned, to recommend measures against countries which are doing little to fight terrorist financing. The mood at the task-force, in fact, is to offer technical assistance rather than to punish laggards. Some countries argue that blacklisting countries-in the Gulf, for example-would hinder international co-operation in the wider war on terrorism.

America's lists of terrorist financiers were accepted by other countries in the months following September 11th. Lately, however, quarrels have broken out. To begin with, the lists' reliability has been questioned. Arabic names were misspelt, basic identifying details, such as place and date of birth, were left out, and some of the people included turned out to be dead. Some countries disagreed about which organizations should be labeled as terrorist. Switzerland and France, for instance, stopped the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, a guerrilla army) from going on the European Union's roster of terrorist organisations, since that might hinder their efforts to help peace in the country. A list of organizations, issued by America in April, started out with 100 names, but got whittled down to ten after a number of countries had their say.

Last November America listed Al-Barakaat, an international money-transfer company, as well as three Somali citizens who work for the company in Sweden. The Swedish government froze their assets, but now it believes that the men are innocent. A similar situation has developed in Switzerland, where Mohamed Mansour, a retired professor, has been listed for being on the board of Bank al Taqwa, another accused institution. The Swiss government is investigating his case to see if he is not in fact innocent. Jacques de Watteville, head of economic and financial affairs at the Swiss foreign ministry, says that there is not yet a clear way for innocent people and organizations to come off the blacklists. The need for a delisting mechanism is under discussion among UN members.

The effort to cut terrorists off from their finances has a long way to go. The next priority will be to devise an effective way to tackle the problem of Islamic charities; task-force members acknowledge that its eighth recommendation on terrorist financing-that countries should review their laws on non-profit organizations-is too vague to be of help. Another subject for debate is hawala, a kind of trust-based network for moving money that operates in many countries and mostly falls outside regulation. Late last year, Congress was minded to ban hawala outright, believing it a key culprit in helping terrorists to move money about. Still, for poorer people remitting money home and so forth, hawala is a boon. At a conference last month in Abu Dhabi, held by the central bank of the United Arab Emirates, American officials said that the cheap efficiency of so-called white hawala, as opposed to the criminal kind, makes it a "beautiful" system.

At the back of the minds of those trying to shut off money, however, is how little terrorists need. Hassan Salameh, a captured Hamas bomber, said that the budget for a suicide bombing is about $1,500.

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

It is one of the most widespread and characteristic beliefs among tudents today, that our times are so unique, so unlike anything which has been known before, that study of the past is of no value, is irrelevant' (Dumoulin 1973: vi) The eminent historical comparativist, Karl Polanyi believed that the great transformation that occurred in the course of the world wars -- from free unregulated markets to welfare states --represented a permanent change, both in the nature of the international system, as well as in its constituent states. But Polanyi did not live to see the beginning of the rise, once again, of the 'unregulated' market. Had he done so, he perhaps would have seen the rise and demise of Europe's nineteenth-century system, not as a once-and-for-all occurrence, but as part of an on-going struggle over the distribution of costs and
benefits of industrial capitalism. It is a struggle, previous sections suggest, that continues today.

Though the free market and the laissez-faire state gave way, in varying degrees, to regulated markets and interventionist states after World War II, the liberal international order survived. The hybrid system that this created has been characterized as one of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982). It was, in fact, Polanyi's analysis of Europe's nineteenth century market system (in The Great Transformation, 1944) that inspired the notion of markets as embedded and dis-embedded. Polanyi iargued that, before the rise of the unregulated market system at the end of the eighteenth century, exchange relations were governed by principles of economic behavior (reciprocity, reallocation, and house-holding) that were 'embedded' in society and politics. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, states began to institute changes that formed the basis of the dis-embedded capitalist development that characterized Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion.

The collapse of the nineteenth century system and the conclusion of a 'compromise' between capital and labour, led to the re-embedding of European economies after 1945. Welfare reforms partially de-commodified labour, and by means of market and industry regulation, investment and production were made to serve the expansion and integration of national markets. Now, however, a campaign to promote the dispersal of capital investment and production to foreign locations--the current 'globalisation' campaign--is seeking to reverse the post-World War II compromise and to dis-embed national markets, once again.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. This paper endeavors to bring this history to bear on what may be the beginning of another iteration of a recurring process of accelerated capitalist globalization. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what this history can illuminate about the nature and the consequences, both at home and abroad, of imperialism today and the processes of globalisation associated with it. Only by delineating the continuities and points of contact between the present and recent past history of imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalisation and the new imperialism', and other supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalisation is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalisation of capital- a process that has been on-going for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation. The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentalities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized, like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center. In developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contrary to Martin Shaw's assertion that 'since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states') Hobson's theory of imperialism continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what Was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. Only by delineating the continuities and points of Contact between the present and recent past history of Imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalization and the 'new imperialism', and other Supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalization is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalization of capital-a process that has been ongoing for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentaities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center, in developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contra to Main Shaw's assertion that 'Since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states')Hobson's of imperialism Continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Read the passages given below and choose the best answer to the questions that follow.

It is supposed that by the act of writing in verse, an author makes a formal engagement that he will gratify certain known habits of association; that he not only thus apprises the reader that certain classes of ideas and expressions will be found in his book, but that others will be carefully excluded. This exponent or symbol held forth by metrical language must, in different eras of literature, have excited very different expectations; for example, in the age of Catullus, Terence, and Lucretius and that of Statius or Claudian; and in our own country, in the age of Shakespeare and Beaumont and Fletcher, and that of Donne and Cowley, or Dryden, or Pope. I will not take it upon myself to determine the exact import of the promise, which by the act of writing in verse, an author in the present day makes to his reader, but I am certain it will appear to many persons that I have not fulfilled the terms of an engagement thus voluntarily contracted. They who have been accustomed to the gaudiness and inane phraseology of many modern writers, if they persist in reading this book to its conclusion, will, no doubt, frequently have to struggle with feelings of strangeness and awkwardness; they will look around for poetry, and will be induced to inquire by what species of courtesy these attempts can be permitted to assume that title. I hope, therefore, the reader will not censure me if I attempt to state what I have proposed to myself to perform; also (as far as the limits of a preface will permit), to explain some of the chief reasons which have determined me in the choice of my purpose; that at least he may be spared any unpleasant feeling of disappointment, and that I myself may be protected from the most dishonorable accusation which can be brought against an author, namely, that of an indolence which prevents him from endeavoring to ascertain what is his duty, or, when his duty is ascertained, prevents him from performing it.

The principle object, then, which I proposed to myself in these poems, was to choose incidents and situations from common life and to relate or describe them, throughout, as far as was possible, in a selection of language really used by men; and at the same time, to throw over them a certain colouring of imagination, whereby ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an unusual way; further, and above all, to make these incidents and situations interesting by tracing in them, truly though not ostentatiously, the primary laws of our nature: chiefly, as far as regards the manner in which we associate ideas in a state of excitement. Low and rustic life was generally chosen, because in that condition, the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which they can attain their maturity, are less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more emphatic language; because in that condition of life our elementary feelings co-exist in a state of greater simplicity, and, consequently, may be more accurately contemplated and more forcibly communicated; because the manners of rural life germinate from those elementary feelings; and, from the necessary character of rural occupations, are more easily comprehended and are more durable; and lastly, because in that condition, the passions of men are incorporated with the beautiful and permanent forms of nature. The language too of these men is adopted (purified indeed from what appear to be its real defects, from all lasting and rational causes of dislike or disgust), because such men hourly communicate with the best objects from which the best part of language is originally derived; and because, from their rank in society and the sameness and narrow circle of their intercourse, being less under the influence of social vanity, they convey their feelings and notions in simple and unelaborated expressions. Accordingly, such a language, arising out of. Repeated experience and regular feelings, is a more permanent and a far more philosophical language than that which is frequently substituted for it by poets, who think that they are conferring honour upon themselves and their art, in proportion as they separate themselves from the sympathies of men, and indulge in arbitrary and capricious habits of expression, in order to furnish food for fickle tastes and fickle appetites of their own creation.

I cannot, however, be insensible of the present outcry against the triviality and meanness both of thought and language, which some of my contemporaries have occasionally introduced into their metrical compositions; and I acknowledge, that this defect, where it exists, is more dishonorable to the writer's own character than false refinement or arbitrary innovation, though I should contend at the same time that it is far less pernicious in the sum of its consequences. From such verses the poems in these volumes will be found distinguished at least by one mark of difference, that each of them has a worthy purpose. Not that I mean to say, that I always began to write with a distinct purpose formally conceived; but I believe that my habits of meditation have so formed my feelings, as that my descriptions of such objects as strongly excite those feelings, will be found to carry along with them a purpose. If in this opinion I am mistaken, I can have little right to the name of a poet.

For all good poetry is necessarily the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: but though this be true, poems to which any value can be attached, were never produced on any variety' of subjects but by a man who, being possessed of more than usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply. For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representatives of all our past feelings; and, as by contemplating the relation of these general representatives to each other we discover what is really important to men, so by the repetition and continuance of this act, our feelings will be connected with important subjects, till at length, if we be originally possessed of much sensibility, such habits of mind will be produced, that, by obeying blindly and mechanically the impulses of those habits, we shall describe objects, and utter sentiments, of such a nature and in such connection with each other, that our understanding of the being to whom we address ourselves, must necessarily be in some degree enlightened.

Read the passage below and answer the questions that follow.

It is one of the most widespread and characteristic beliefs among students today, that our times are so unique, so unlike anything which has been known before, that study of the past is of no value, is irrelevant' (Dumoulin 1973: vi) The eminent historical comparativist, Karl Polanyi believed that the great transformation that occurred in the course of the world wars -- from free unregulated markets to welfare states --represented a permanent change, both in the nature of the international system, as well as in its constituent states. But Polanyi did not live to see the beginning of the rise, once again, of the 'unregulated' market. Had he done so, he perhaps would have seen the rise and demise of Europe's nineteenth-century system, not as a once-and-for-all occurrence, but as part of an on-going struggle over the distribution of costs and
benefits of industrial capitalism. It is a struggle, previous sections suggest, that continues today.

Though the free market and the laissez-faire state gave way, in varying degrees, to regulated markets and interventionist states after World War II, the liberal international order survived. The hybrid system that this created has been characterized as one of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1982). It was, in fact, Polanyi's analysis of Europe's nineteenth century market system (in The Great Transformation, 1944) that inspired the notion of markets as embedded and dis-embedded. Polanyi iargued that, before the rise of the unregulated market system at the end of the eighteenth century, exchange relations were governed by principles of economic behavior (reciprocity, reallocation, and house-holding) that were 'embedded' in society and politics. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, states began to institute changes that formed the basis of the dis-embedded capitalist development that characterized Europe's nineteenth century industrial expansion. 

The collapse of the nineteenth century system and the conclusion of a 'compromise' between capital and labour, led to the re-embedding of European economies after 1945. Welfare reforms partially de-commodified labour, and by means of market and industry regulation, investment and production were made to serve the expansion and integration of national markets. Now, however, a campaign to promote the dispersal of capital investment and production to foreign locations--the current 'globalisation' campaign--is seeking to reverse the post-World War II compromise and to dis-embed national markets, once again.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. This paper endeavors to bring this history to bear on what may be the beginning of another iteration of a recurring process of accelerated capitalist globalization. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what this history can illuminate about the nature and the consequences, both at home and abroad, of imperialism today and the processes of globalisation associated with it. Only by delineating the continuities and points of contact between the present and recent past history of imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalisation and the new imperialism', and other supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalisation is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalisation of capital- a process that has been on-going for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation. The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentalities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized, like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center. In developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contrary to Martin Shaw's assertion that 'since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states') Hobson's theory of imperialism continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.

Globalization, then, is not, as Francis Fukuyama and others have argued, the end point of an evolutionary process (nor, as is often argued, is it one that is working to move all societies in the direction of liberal democracy). 'Globalization' is neither a radical and absolute break with the past nor the result of an evolutionary process, but a recurring phenomenon within capitalism.

A similar campaign to free capital from restrictions imposed by local communities was launched at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the current campaign, it worked to reconfigure the structure of political power by means of a broad-based far-reaching, and all-encompassing ideological and political assault on what Was depicted, and rapidly came to be seen, as the 'old order'. Only by delineating the continuities and points of Contact between the present and recent past history of Imperialism, can we be clear about what is new about globalization and the 'new imperialism', and other Supposedly new constellations and mechanisms of power.

Here, globalization is defined as a period of acceleration in the globalization of capital-a process that has been ongoing for at least four centuries, and that involves the dis-embedding of markets locally, and dependence primarily on external expansion for accumulation The definition of 'Imperium' used here is the one suggested by Ronnie Lipschutz in his paper for this conference ('The Clash of Governmentaities: the Fall of the U.N. Republic and America's Reach for Imperium'): a situation characterized like Empire, by an integrated global network of accumulation and exchange; but one in which governmentality emanates from the center, in developing this argument, I will endeavor to show that, contra to Main Shaw's assertion that 'Since the Second World War, classic theories of imperialism have lost much of their purchase' (in his paper for this conference, 'Exploring Imperia: Western global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states')Hobson's of imperialism Continues to have, at least as much relevance today, as do recent efforts to theorise (re)current trends in world politics.